Owl What it catches

Field notes / Coverage / Nov 15, 2026

What Owl catches, and what it can't

Every attack I mapped against the app, in four groups: caught with proof, warned about, ways around, and what no phone can see.

Caught Ways around Impossible Next

Sample 01 / Why this page exists

Why I wrote this page

This page lists every way I found to attack Owl, what Owl does about each one, and what nothing on a phone can do anything about.

I wrote it by reading my own code the way an attacker would. I would rather you read the limits here than find them yourself. None of the weak spots below has been seen used against Owl. Where I describe an attack, I got it from the code and have not run it, so read each one as what the code says should happen.

Sample 02 / What the current build proves

What Owl catches with proof

Owl says fake when an address fails a certificate check for the name it was given. These are the cases that get there.

A bad certificate
The network gives an address that encrypted DNS did not. Owl connects to it and asks for the site's certificate. If the certificate is not signed by anyone the phone trusts, while the real address proves itself, the name is fake.
A certificate for another site
The address answers with a valid certificate, but for a different name. That fails the same way.
An address that turns Owl away
Every address the network gave refuses the connection while the real address has a valid certificate. A refusal counts. A timeout does not, because a slow network looks the same.
A forged address among real ones
One fake hidden in a list of real addresses is caught if it is one of the first three Owl tests. I list the cases past three below.
A borrowed real address
The network points a name at another real site's address. That site's certificate names the wrong site, so it fails.

In my own runs on five honest resolvers, Owl raised 0 false alarms in 770 checks, and it called my demo liar fake on all of the first 20 names. Those runs used my own liar, not a real attacker. The test suite has 1,655 tests: 1,645 pass and 10 are skipped because they need a live network. The details are in docs/ACCURACY.md.

Sample 03 / Warnings, never a verdict of fake

What Owl warns about

These checks can tell you something is off. None of them can prove a lie, so none of them says fake.

  • A different address that fails its certificate check when the real address fails it too. A bad certificate proves nothing there.
  • An address that only times out.
  • A network that blocks every encrypted DNS provider. Owl says it can't tell, and never reports clean.
  • A DNS server the phone has never been handed on this network, a new DHCP server (Android 11 and up), or a new IPv6 router.
  • A handed-out DNS server on the NCSC's April 2026 list, or a public one Owl doesn't know, named with its registered owner.
  • A router that names itself as a model the NCSC lists. Being named is not the same as being broken into.
  • A router with telnet answering.
  • A network that answers DNS meant for Cloudflare or Google, or invents an address for a name that can't exist.
  • A device on the Wi-Fi that answers for made-up names the way password-collecting tools do.
  • A plain web page that arrives changed or redirected, from the one page Owl fetches today.
  • A network that stopped asking for a password it always asked for, or shows a proxy it never had.
  • Secure connections to three names turned down with the same issuer while a control passes. That is the interception check.
  • A fake IPv6 answer. It is a warning for now, until I have measured it on networks that route IPv6.
  • A user-added certificate authority, and a phone clock more than five minutes off.

Sample 04 / New on Nov 15

Added on Nov 15

I added four checks on the morning of Nov 15. Each one shows in the technical detail view in the app, and none of them changes a verdict or goes into a ticket. They have unit tests and one quiet run on my own network. None has met a real attack.

A certificate with no Certificate Transparency record

Public certificate authorities log the certificates they issue, and the log's receipt is usually embedded in the certificate. When a valid certificate carries no embedded record, Owl adds a note. It reads the certificate Owl already fetched and sends nothing anywhere. A note is all it is. Some real certificates deliver the record another way, so a missing one is a weak sign on its own.

Two different answers to one DNS lookup

Owl keeps listening for 400 ms after the first answer to three plain DNS questions. An honest path gives one answer. Two different answers mean something on the path is racing the real DNS server. It shows something answered, and it doesn't say who.

A web page that changed in transit

Owl fetches example.com in the clear and compares it with its HTTPS copy, twice before it says anything. If they differ, the page changed on the way. It also asks paypal.com over plain HTTP, and notes it when a page comes back where a redirect to HTTPS should. A changed page shows tampering and doesn't say who did it.

The same wrong certificate at several sites

When the DNS answers agree, Owl now connects to each of those sites at its real address anyway. Two or more of them showing one wrong certificate, or certificates from one untrusted issuer, means a box in between is answering in their place. This starts to cover a router that leaves DNS alone and redirects the connection. It is a note in the detail view for now, and it does not raise the verdict.

Sample 05 / Ways around Owl that I know about

Ways around Owl that I know about

These are the ways I know to get past Owl. I found them reading my own code. I have not run an attack for any of them, and none has been seen used against Owl.

An attacker who can tell Owl from a real client

Owl's lookups carry a mark
Every Owl question is built the same way, Owl asks a few names nobody else asks, and a dig is 54 lookups in about a second. A router told to answer those honestly and lie to everyone else passes. I captured both on an Android 16 emulator on Nov 15: the phone's own lookups left one header flag clear, and every one of Owl's set it. To close it: send what the phone sends, shuffle and spread the lookups out, and send the hello a browser sends. The patient version is a slow dig over hours. That raises the cost and can't remove it.
Sign-in hold used against Owl
Owl waits when Android says the network wants a sign-in. A hostile network can keep that flag set, so Owl doesn't dig until you tap. That blinds Owl and doesn't give a wrong answer. To close it: say so loudly when the hold lasts.
Only the first DNS server is compared
A rogue second server is never asked about names. It is still looked up and covered by the switch alert. To close it: ask every server the network hands out.

Redirecting connections instead of lying in DNS

Three names are checked
The interception check tests the first three names on the list, which are demo names. A router that answers DNS honestly and redirects secure connections for a bank name never gets tested. Since Nov 15 the detail view connects to every name whose DNS answers agree and notes a shared wrong certificate. The verdict itself still rests on three names. To close it: test every name on the list in the verdict too.
Only three addresses are tested
Owl tests the first three addresses the network gave that encrypted DNS didn't. Three real ones followed by a fake one passes, and an app that walks past the first address reaches the fake. To close it: test them all.
A translated address skips the test
On a network that runs IPv6-only with address translation, an answer that wraps a real address is accepted without a handshake. It is narrow. To close it: test the wrapped address once.

A certificate for the attacker's own name

Served on both paths
A router that owns the path can serve one free, valid certificate for its own domain on the fake address and on the real one. Owl sees the same certificate in both places and calls the name genuine. You would get a certificate warning in the browser, and plain HTTP phishing needs no certificate at all. To close it: only accept the match when the certificate's names share a registered domain with the name asked.
Not counted by the interception check
A box showing a valid certificate for its own name isn't counted as turning the connection down, and even a counted one needs two names with the same issuer. To close it: count it, and warn on one failure when the control passes.

Taking away the encrypted reference

Removed one name at a time
My encrypted DNS requests aren't padded, so the size on the wire hints at the name's length. A router that resets connections to the providers at that size could take the reference away for chosen names. With the reference gone the name is skipped, and up to half of the 54 can be skipped while the headline stays clean. This is untested. To close it: pad the requests and warn when some names lost their reference and others didn't.
Failing a provider on purpose
Owl stops asking a provider for five seconds after eight failures in a row. Enough forced failures early in a dig could take a provider out for the names that follow. Untested, and I haven't worked out how the names line up. To close it: retry, and ask over mobile data if you allow it.

The rest

IPv6 questions given up on
If two IPv6 questions get no answer, Owl stops comparing IPv6 for every later name, without saying so. To close it: decide per name.
Lifetimes not read
Owl reads each answer's time to live and never looks at it. A lie with a lifetime of days would stay in caches after the router is fixed. To close it: flag a local lifetime far above what encrypted DNS reports.
A reassurance I haven't earned
When Android's Private DNS is on automatic, Owl says the phone's own lookups are already encrypted. In that mode Android doesn't check who the server is. It changes no verdict. To close it: change the words.

Sample 06 / The router side

What Guard on the router is for

Owl Guard runs on the router. From there it can see things a phone can't.

These are the ones I know about. Guard checks the first one as of Nov 15 and none of the rest yet. It also reads the router's DNS and DHCP settings, whether the web page, SSH and firewall are open to the internet, and it checks 15 sites against encrypted DNS. Its OpenWrt side is tested against saved output and has not run on a real router.

  • A firewall rule that quietly redirects DNS or web traffic for everything on the home network. I think Guard's own lookups start on the router and skip such a rule, so Guard would see an honest resolver while every device is redirected. I haven't tested that. So since Nov 15 Guard reads the router's NAT rules themselves, and says when the house's lookups or web connections are sent somewhere else. That reader is tested against rule listings I wrote by hand and has never read a real router.
  • Port mappings the router opened to the internet (UPnP), including ones that point outside the home network.
  • A second device on the network handing out addresses or IPv6 routes. A phone can't listen for those. A program running as root on the router can.
  • Extra Wi-Fi names, new SSH keys, scheduled jobs, changed packages and open listening ports.
  • A Guard that goes quiet. Today the desk doesn't notice, and a router the attacker controls can stop Guard. The fix is a check that runs outside the router.
  • A lie told to one device and not another. Comparing what a phone and a laptop each see in one home would show it. I haven't built that.

Even then, an attacker with root on the router can lie to Guard, and a router whose firmware was swapped for something that behaves honestly to everyone can't be told from a good one without help from outside the box.

Sample 07 / Limits of the phone

What no phone app can detect, and why

Some attacks leave nothing a phone app can observe. Saying so is better than faking a check.

Someone listening
A copy of your traffic changes nothing the phone can see. Encryption is the defense, not detection.
A full relay with a valid certificate
If the attacker passes your connection through to the real site, or holds a valid certificate for the real name, the phone sees what a browser sees. A site owner watching Certificate Transparency logs could notice. The phone can't.
An attacker who never lies to the checker
Every probe Owl sends can in principle be told apart from a real app's. I can raise the cost a lot, and I can't make it impossible.
Who is behind the Wi-Fi name
Android hides the access point's name and address from apps without the location permission, and Owl never asks for it. A copy of your Wi-Fi with the same password looks like the original.
The neighbor table
Android 10 and later block apps from reading which devices sit on the local network, so an ARP spoof can't be seen directly.
Fake cell towers
I found no public Android way for an app to see which tower it is on, or to read the phone's warnings about it, and tower identity needs permissions Owl won't hold.
A route hijack far away
A hijack of someone else's network is visible to the phone only through symptoms Owl already tests, like a certificate mismatch.
A person clicking through a warning
Owl can say a name is fake. It can't stop a tap on a certificate warning, and that is how the 2026 router campaign worked.
TunnelVision
This attack hides traffic with routes pushed by DHCP option 121. Android's DHCP client ignores that option, so it doesn't apply to the phone.

Sample 08 / Next

What I'm building next

These are the gaps I think Owl can close, in the order I rank them. Most take hours to a day. None is built yet.

  1. Stop marking Owl's lookups, and spread them out.
  2. Run the interception check on every name, and count a certificate for the wrong name.
  3. Pad the encrypted lookups, and warn loudly when only some names lose their reference.
  4. Test every address the network gives, not the first three.
  5. Ask every DNS server the network hands out.
  6. Fetch more than one plain page and check that secure sites redirect to HTTPS.
  7. Read HTTPS records and the lifetime of answers.
  8. Read the router's UPnP port mappings.
  9. Notice the phone's clock jumping between digs.
  10. Notice a DNS server that isn't on the home network, and IPv6 turning up late.

The source is at gitlab.com/Munzzyy/owl. The developer version of this list, with code references, is in docs/THREAT_MODEL.md.